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Summary  findings
Most old people in developing countries are uninsured  At the same time, the number of uninsured or
by formal social security programs. Economic growth is  underinsured  (who have contributed only small amounts)
the key to increased coverage, but policy also matters,  could increase, as a result of the tighter benefit-
argues James.  contribution link.
Contributory insurance programs may not work for  The uninsured fall into two groups:
much of the population in developing economies.  *  Workers who spend much of their lives in
Moreover, the tradeoffs between higher take-home  agriculture or the informal sector (often self-employed or
pay and old-age benefits, between maximizing coverage  in small firms), in jobs not covered by contributory
and minimizing evasion, and between increased coverage  programs. Many of these workers are low earners, for
and greater competitiveness, must be carefully evaluated  whom contributing today for potential old-age benefits
before opting for expanded  coverage, especially among  may not be welfare-enhancing - and governments do
low-income groups.  not have the capacity to compel contributions.  Social
Keeping the contribution rate low and including some  security reforms that make benefits contingent  on
redistribution toward low-income groups in contributory  contributions should include better social assistance
systems may help reduce the number of uninsured, while  programs for these low-income groups. Efficient
avoiding costly tradeoffs.  program design and program costs must also be
Recent years have seen a tighter link between benefits  considered.
and contributions  in contributory  systems - most  *  Women who, having worked mostly in the
obviously in the shift toward multipillar systems with  household, expect to be supported  by the family system,
large defined-contribution  components, usually  which may fail them in old age. Family support for
accompanied by a modest redistributive public pillar.  dependent  spouses should be incorporated  into the pay-
This tighter link makes social security systems more  out phase of the defined-contribution  pillar, to keep old
fiscally sustainable and may be considered a precondition  women out of poverty.
for financially sound expansion of coverage.
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This is a most important issue for those of us concerned about developing economies,
because the majority of  workers and  old people in  these countries are uninsured by
formal social security programs. Coverage ranges from less than  10% in Sub-Saharan
Africa and South Asia and less than 30% in most of East Asia, to 50-60% in the middle
income  countries  of  South  America,  70-80%  in  the  Eastern  European  transition
economies and 90-100% in the small group of OECD countries (World Bank,  1994).
This paper argues that:
*  economic development is the major determinant of coverage rate but policies chosen
by governments also matter-for  example a low contribution rate and high rate of
return may encourage compliance;
*  recent social security reforms may increase the degree of insurance for some workers
but decrease it for others;
*  coverage under a contributory program may not be feasible or desirable for large
portions of the population in developing economies,
*  systems  that  link  contributions  with  benefits  should  be  accompanied  by  social
assistance that  redistributes  to  the  lowest  income  groups  among informal  sector
workers who are outside the contributory schemes and
family support for dependent spouses should be incorporated into the design of the
contributory schemes.
To start: Countries have dealt with old age security in three alternative ways, that have
differing impacts on the prevalence of the uninsured:
*  A universal social security system (or first pillar in a multi-pillar system) that delinks
benefits and contributions and covers everyone; i.e. there are no uninsured.
- A contributory social security system that closely links benefits and contributions,
thereby creating a class that has not contributed and is not insured.
*  The most traditional system, the family, which often insures its members and still has
a supplementary  role to play in the presence of formal public and private systems.
As discussed in Part I, in recent years we observe a shift away from the first alternative
and toward the second--a tighter link between benefits and contributions--most obviously
in the shift toward multi-pillar systems with  a large defined contribution component.
This augments the fiscal sustainability of social security systems and therefore may be
considered a pre-condition for financially sound coverage expansion.  At the same time,
ironically, it runs the risk  of increasing the number of uninsured or partially insured.
While compliance among long term workers may rise, it may fall among those who no
longer receive windfall gains. Moreover, those who have only contributed small amounts
receive small benefits and in this sense are only partially insured.
We argue that contributory insurance for many of these workers, particularly for low
income workers, is neither feasible nor desirable.  If the contribution rate is borne by
2workers, it may reduce their take-home pay at a point in the life cycle when they need
more income rather than less; and if borne by employers it may reduce the number of
jobs in the economy. If efforts are made to increase nominal coverage for these workers,
under a scheme where benefits closely depend on contributions, the result may be greater
evasion rather than greater effective coverage.
The uninsured fall into two main groups: workers who have labor market jobs that are not
covered by  contributory programs  (e.g. the  self-employed, the  informal  sector);  and
women, who have worked in the household rather than the labor market for most of their
lives, expecting to be supported by the family system, which may fail them in old age.
For the first group, social security reforms that make benefits contingent on contributions
have been or should be accompanied by enhanced social assistance programs targeted
toward low income groups-creating  the need to  design such programs efficiently and
take their costs into account in planning the reform.  For the second group, consideration
should be given to designing the pay-out phase of the defined contribution pillar so that it
provides lifetime income to dependent spouses to keep them out of poverty.
These issues concerning informal sector workers and women are discussed in Parts II and
III. They are salient issues in many Latin American countries, which have just  gone
through  the first wave  of  social security reforms  and are now  ready for the  second
stage-fine-tuning  and  reforming  the  reforms.  The  Conclusion  summarizes  policy
implications.
1. How Social Security Creates a Class of Uninsured
Universal benefits-no  uninsured
Some countries do not have a problem of "uninsured old" because they have universal
flat (uniform) or very broad means-tested old age security benefits. These include many
OECD countries, such as the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Canada, New Zealand and
Australia.  In  these  countries,  employment  and  contributions  are  not  required  for
inclusion.  Instead, the old age benefit is typically financed out of general revenues and
all residents are eligible to receive it once they reach the specified age. This approach
solves the problem of coverage since there are no uninsured and it eliminates poverty in
old age so long as the benefit is above the poverty line.
However, it  poses several other problems,  chief among them  being fiscal problems.
Universal old age benefits are costly and as populations age they become more costly.
To  finance these benefits either requires a  large increase in tax rates, which may be
distortionary, or a  cut in  other important social programs.  This  approach also poses
political economy problems, stemming from the need to reach a collective agreement on
the level of the uniform benefit and how it should be financed.
Are universal uniform general-revenue-financed old age benefits, for a traditional social
security  system  or  for  the  first  pillar  of  a  multi-pillar  system,  a  good  option  for
developing countries?  Recently Bolivia established such a first pillar in the form of the
"bonosol," a universal benefit financed from the proceeds of a "collective capitalization
3fund" that contains the government's shares of state enterprises that are in the process of
being privatized. The benefit initially was slated to be 11% of the average wage; 50-85%
of the income of poor workers (Queisser, 1998, von Gersdorff, 1997).  However, it was
quickly cut and it is even less clear what will happen when the capitalization fund is
exhausted.  Probably for most  developing countries, a universal old  age benefit is  a
luxury they cannot afford, nor is it the best use for their limited public resources.
The great income inequality in  developing countries  also makes a universal  uniform
benefit implausible, because it would be hard to reach a collective decision on its size and
method of financing.  When income is unequal, a uniform benefit that is reasonable from
the point of a poor worker would be negligible for a rich worker who would therefore be
uninterested in supporting it. But a benefit that is high enough for the rich worker would
exceed the wage level of a poor worker, and would be very expensive for the economy as
a whole.  Relatedly, when incomes are very unequal, typically only a minority of people
pay general taxes, and these people would oppose financing a universal benefit-making
it infeasible from a political economy point of view.  Bolivia, where incomes are very
unequal, tried to avoid these problem by using proceeds associated with a privatization
program, but it is not clear that the bonosol will last.  Note that the OECD countries with
universal benefits all have a high degree of income equality.
Contributory systems: the development of the uninsured
Most  countries,  including  almost  all  developing  countries,  finance  old  age  security
through  earmarked taxes,  called "contributions"  rather than  through  general  revenue
finance.  The programs are for those who make contributions rather than being universal,
and  the benefits they  pay  depend on  the  level  of  contributions.  This  emphasis on
contributory systems, financed by earmarked taxes rather than general revenue finance,
with benefits contingent on contributions, is used to increase the public's willingness to
pay and to decrease distortionary evasionary techniques.  But it has the side-effect of
creating a class of uninsured or partially insured individuals who have contributed little
or nothing in their working years and may be left in poverty in old age.
Why are most social security schemes contributory,  financed by earmarked taxes? When
an individual pays general taxes, he or she does not know exactly what benefits will be
received in return.  In some countries the majority of people may feel that a dollar's
worth of taxes does not buy them a dollar's  worth of benefits, because of government
waste, debts from the past that do not generate current benefits, or inefficient spending
patterns.  Generally, access to public benefits is not contingent on whether or how much
taxes have been paid by the individual; hence the incentive is to pay little and to hide
sources of taxable income.  In addition, some  general tax revenues may be  spent on
deliberate  redistribution  among  population  groups.  In  this  case,  those  who  are
redistributed against have an additional reason to oppose high tax rates.
This lack of connection between taxes and benefits under general revenue finance sets
both economic and political limits on the amount of general taxes people are willing to
pay.  The economic limit takes the form of evasion and distortion of incentives to work,
4save and allocate resources efficiently.  The political limit takes the form of collective
actions (voting, lobbying) that prevent the government from  raising general tax rates
beyond a certain point. These limits may differ from country to country, depending on its
economic and political culture, but each country has such limits.
An earmarked tax or contributory program is designed to extend the frontiers on these
economic and political  limits.  The basic idea is that  when taxes are earmarked for
particular benefits, people will perceive them as a price for a desired service, and will be
willing to pay this price over and above their general tax obligations, with less incentive
to evade.  In addition, earmarked taxes tied to particular benefits become a means of
visibly  limiting redistribution  or  changing  the  direction  of  redistribution in  a  more
politically acceptable way.  For both reasons, they allow the government to extend its tax
and spending frontier. They are used, in particular, for the financing of services such as
education, medical care and old  age insurance, that  are quasi-public or private in the
sense  that  exclusion  is  possible,  rather  than  for  public  goods  of  which  everyone
automatically partakes.  People who do not contiibute do not get access to these services,
and the amount you contribute may determine how much benefit you receive, thereby
making the system more fiscally sustainable and less distortionary.
In theory and rhetoric, in most countries social security benefits are tied to specific taxes
that people pay, although in reality this link has often been broken in non-transparent
ways.  Indeed, many of the problems faced by traditional pay-as-you-go defined benefit
social  security  systems in  Latin  America  stemmed  from  the  weak  linkage  between
benefits and contributions (easy eligibility, lax disability, early retirement, excessively
high  rates  of  return) that  was  both  inequitable  and  financially  unsustainable.  The
obligations of these systems far exceeded their earmarked revenues. A major objective of
the recent wave  of multi-pillar reforms,  which include  a funded defined contribution
pillar, has been to tie benefits more closely to earmarked contributions.  Hopefully this
will facilitate tax collection, although for reasons given below the compliance effect may
be low.  Regardless of whether it affects evasion, it should at least enable revenues to
cover  obligations  and  hence  make  the  system  more  sustainable  for  those  who  do
participate.
Why the payroll tax base for  old age security?  The earmarked tax for old age security
programs is usually based on the wage bill, commonly with ceilings and  occasionally
with floors.  That is, the returns to capital are not taxed to finance these programs, nor is
property taxed.  One rationale for a payroll base is that pensions in old age are designed
to replace wages that people receive when they are able to work, hence the amount both
of taxes and benefits should be tied to  wages. However, it should be  noted that this
connection to wages is not inevitable.  For example, in countries that finance universal
prograrns out of general revenues, capital as well as labor is taxed.  Unless the benefit
also increases for holders of capital, this makes the programs more redistributive. People
who will  be redistributed away from will  oppose this  financing method,  giving us  a
second, political economy, reason for its infrequent use.
5A third and more pragmatic reason for payroll tax finance is that such deductions are the
easiest way administratively to reach large segments of the population, who do not file
income tax  returns  in  many  countries.  A  sales  or  value  added tax  would  also  be
administratively feasible, but would make it more difficult to keep track of the taxes paid
by each individual, hence to connect benefits and contributions. Payroll tax finance is
administratively easy-both  for collection and for record-keeping purposes.
The consequence: uncovered groups  without formal  labor market  experience.  While
possibly  ameliorating the  political  and  economic limits  to  taxation  and  government
spending, contributory programs based on earmarked payroll taxes create a problem that
did not exist under universal programs-they  create a distinction between covered and
non-covered groups that  depends on labor market  experience.  The uncovered group
consists of two subsets:
*  those who have little or no labor market experience (primarily women) and
*  those with labor market experience, but in "informal sector" jobs, where contributions
were not collected.
Somewhat different analyses applies to these two  groups: Women presumably expect
their monetary needs to be met through the family system, so they work in the household,
without earning wages or pension rights.  Their problem is that this expectation of their
youth may not be realized when they grow old.  Workers in the informal sector earn
wages to satisfy their monetary needs when young, but fail to accumulate pension rights
that will provide an income when they grow old.  In the second half of this paper I
discuss the remedies that may be appropriate to solve the problem of old age poverty in
each of these groups.
The trend toward a closer benefit-contribution link and its impact on the uninsured
Social security reforms  in recent  years have featured  a  strengthening of the benefit-
contribution link.  These reforms, we expect, will have beneficial effects on the fiscal
sustainability of the  systems and  will reduce their  distortionary  labor market effects
(especially the impact on early retirement).  But they may have unintended effects on
coverage.  On the one hand, they may encourage compliance among long term workers,
but  on the other hand  they may discourage compliance among those who no  longer
receive windfall gains and reduce benefits substantially for those who contribute for only
part  of their  working lives,  thereby increasing the  number  of uninsured  or partially
insured in old age. I will give several sets of examples, from Latin American and OECD
countries.
The multi-pillar systems that have been springing up over most of Latin America include
a public  pillar that  is  redistributive and  often general-revenue financed.  However, it
usually applies only to those who contribute to the second pillar; it redistributes to the
low income groups among those who have contributed.  If both the first and  second
pillars apply only to workers who have contributed, this sets up a distinction between the
insured and non-insured and allows old age poverty to  develop among the uninsured.
6Also, if benefits depend on amount and years of contributions, this sets up a category we
might call the "partially insured" who receive only meager pensions.
For example, Chile provides a minimum pension guarantee of 25% of the average wage
to  workers who have contributed at least 20 years to  their individual accounts in  the
second pillar, and many other countries have followed this example.  Accumulations in
the second pillar are supplemented by the government to bring the annual benefit to this
level.  This guarantee will protect low income covered workers, especially those who
have contributed for only 20 years.  It provides an incentive for low income workers to
stay in the system for 20 years-and  to evade thereafter (a guarantee that increased with
years of contributions might have been more efficient and egalitarian).  Because of this
incentive, many workers may indeed strive to attain the 20 year minimum.  But certain
groups, such as the self-employed, are simply not eligible for coverage, and some women
may, by custom or  labor market structure, lack access to jobs  outside of the household.
A smaller social assistance benefit, about 12% of the average wage, is provided to the
poorest among these groups (World Bank, 1994).
The Brazilian social security system has long included an "age"  pension which, at a
specified age (65 and 60 for urban men and women, 60 and 55 for rural men and women,
respectively), pays 70% of the wage base to workers who have contributed for at least 5
years.  The typical pension was one minimum salary, about 30% of the average wage.
The Brazilian system also included a much more generous pension based on length of
service, that required thirty years of covered employment and paid 5-6 minimum salaries
to the average beneficiary.  The "length of service" pension went mainly to urban men
who worked in the formal labor force for most of their lives.  The age pension went
mainly to women, especially rural women.  For example, in  1997 out  of 5.2 million
recipients of the age pension, 75% were rural dwellers and 62% were women, while 83%
of the 2.9 million recipients of the length of service pensions were urban men (Instituto
Nacional do Seguro Social, 1998).
Because  of  its  low  employment requirement,  the  age pension  was a  form  of  near-
universal  redistributive  social  assistance,  targeted  toward  rural  areas  and  women.
However  (as  a  consequence  of  this  and  other  features),  Brazil  faces  severe  fiscal
problems in  its  social security system,  as benefits exceed  contributions, and  evasion
problems as workers were increasingly tempted to escape to the informal sector, cease
contributing, and collect the age pension.  As part of the reform process that began in the
mid 1990's and is on-going today, the contribution requirement for the age pension will
gradually increase to fifteen years (World Bank, 1998).  This change will likely improve
compliance and sustainability, but rural women and others who do not have a chance to
participate in the formal labor market for fifteen years may become destitute.
As another example, Uruguay previously had an age pension that required  10 years of
covered employment, but  the required contributory  period was raised to  15 years  in
Uruguay's recent pension reform (Queisser, 1998; Law 16.713, Capitulo II, Article 68).
Undoubtedly this will have the same beneficial effects on fiscal sustainability, but the fate
of the uninsured is unclear.  Means-tested assistance outside of the contributory plan is
7likely  to  increase, but  in  most  cases this  projected increase has not  been taken  into
account while planning the reform.
In  recent  years  several  OECD countries  have  replaced their  single pillar  universal
systems with  multi-pillar systems, because of the growing fiscal strain.  That is, the
universal defined benefit, in reduced form, has become the first pillar while a second
mandatory pillar that is contributory, funded and privately managed has been added.  In
these countries, the second pillar generally builds on pre-existing plans established by
collective bargaining and now extended by government.  Given this history, union and/or
employer trustees play an important role in managing the assets in the second pillar.  The
existence of the second contributory pillar permits cutbacks in the size of benefits from
the first universal pillar, but it also creates a new problem of the "partially uninsured."
Commonly, this has been addressed by offering larger means-tested benefits for those
who are not in or who receive only small benefits from the contributory second pillar.
For  example,  Denmark recently  decided  gradually  to  raise  contributions  to  funded
occupational defined contribution plans (its  second pillar) to  9-12% of wages, which
should eventually  provide a  replacement  rate  of 45%,  and  decrease  the  size of  the
universal flat benefit (its first pillar) to 25% of the average wage.  Of course, this means
that those with  limited employment experience (women, self-employed, farmers) will
receive  smaller  benefits  than  others  in  their  cohort  and  less  than  they  would  have
previously.  In this sense, they are only partially insured.  To offset this, the government
will  offer a  means-tested benefit to  those  without  second pillar  pensions.  So, it  is
supplementing the first (public universal) pillar with a second (private contributory) pillar
on the one hand and a means-tested "zero" pillar for the partially insured, on the other
hand (Ploug 1993 and discussions with author, 1998).
Australia, too, added a mandatory occupational saving pillar that will cut demands on its
universal means and asset-tested age pension, but the latter remains for those who do not
accumulate enough in the  second  pillar  (Bateman and Piggott,  1998).  The  UK has
decreased the value of its flat basic pension relative to the average wage, and increased
the  role  both  of  private  defined  contribution  pensions  and  public  means-tested
supplements (Johnson, 1998; Whitehouse, 1998).
A major issue in all reforming countries is what to do about those groups who have not
contributed  for long  enough  to  qualify  for  adequate benefits  from  the  contributory
program, as the benefit-contribution link increases.  This issue is particularly great in
developing countries because of the large size of the informal sector and the low labor
force participation rate of women.
II.  Noninsured Workers in the Informal Sector
Why increased coverage is not the solution in the short run
Although earmarked taxes and defined contribution plans for old age security are used to
increase peoples'  willingness to pay and to  decrease evasion, they do not  completely
8succeed in this goal, for a number of reasons.  The most basic reason is that not everyone
wants the particular service being supplied.  In the case of old age pensions, indeed, one
reason for public intervention is that people may be myopic or may think they can fall
back on public charity if they don't  contribute; if  not for these problems, the private
market might suffice.  The government mandate is designed to overcome these problems
of myopia and moral hazard.  But it still leaves the government with a large enforcement
problem, as workers try to evade payments.  Governments in developing countries often
lack  the  necessary  enforcement  capabilities.  Thus  they  face  a  trade-off  between
maximizing nominal coverage and minimizing evasion-which  is a contagious social
disease.
Moreover, even if increased effective coverage were feasible, it might not be desirable.
Some workers are better off outside the formal retirement old age security system, with
higher take-home pay, which would be reduced by social security contributions. Policy-
makers thus face a trade-off between higher coverage and higher current consumption.
And if the burden of the contributions falls on employers instead of workers, it raises
labor  costs,  reducing  international  competitiveness  and  employment.  In  this  case,
governments  face  a  trade  off  between  maximizing  coverage  and  maximizing
employment. This trade-off may be decreased  and coverage increased if a  low target
replacement rate and required contribution rate are chosen.
Rational reasons for  non-participation among the poor.  In  addition to  myopia,  low
income workers may have perfectly rational utility-maximizing reasons for preferring to
stay  out  of the  old  age system  and  for  evading contributions  if  they are nominally
covered.  They have relatively short expected lifetimes, so it may make more sense for
them to use their meager incomes to survive at present rather than saving for the distant
future, when they may not be alive. This effect is accentuated if, at the annuities stage,
they are merged with high income workers who have greater expected longevity, thereby
depressing benefits and returns for the poor.
Moreover, even when they save, the best rate of return for them may come from investing
in  land, homes, tools, or the education of their children, who will return the loan by
supporting them in the future.  In most low and middle income countries, older people
live in multi-generational households and their consumptions levels therefore depend on
the earnings of their  children more than their own pensions.  Investing in the human
capital of their children or in a family business may be the best old age security program
for them. Lacking access to well functioning credit markets and facing exceedingly high
borrowing rates, farmers, the self-employed and low income groups generally are forced
to  use  personal savings to  finance these  investments.  They may, understandably,  be
reluctant to lock up their modest savings in a long term retirement program that will not
be available to  meet shorter term investment, educational, health  or other emergency
needs.  This objection holds  during both  the accumulation and  the pay-out  stages,  if
gradual withdrawals are required. Permitting borrowing against retirement funds or lump
sum withdrawals upon  retirement might  diminish this  resistance-but  these  depleted
accounts might never be replenished and lump sums might be quickly spent, defeating the
original purpose of the old age program.
9Consistent with this hypothesis, a study of contributions patterns in Peru showed that the
self-employed, farmers and low income workers are less likely to contribute regularly
(Queisser,  1998). Empirical evidence from  savings programs  targeted to  the poor  in
Mexico and Indonesia show that these groups will indeed save, but they place a high
value on liquidity and therefore choose short rather than long term financial instruments.
Moreover, such savings are invariably small, much less than needed for old age security
(Aportela, 1999).  Extending coverage by requiring low income informal sector workers
to contribute to social security would not be in the best interests of these workers in such
circumstances, even if the government had the capacity to enforce the mandate. Workers
may be made worse off by covering them because current take-home pay combined with
liquid short term investments have a greater value to them than future retirement benefits,
which they may never live to receive.
Furthermore, the pension  tax may  be part  of a  larger package  with  other taxes  and
benefits that have even less value to workers. In this case, the package as a whole may be
worth less than its combined cost, even if benefits outweigh contributions for the pension
part  alone. Breaking  up  the package  may  then  facilitate  old  age  coverage  (but  the
converse may also be true if other social security benefits are highly valued).
Usually employers are responsible for part of the contribution, giving them an incentive
to operate out of the system if they see this as a way to reduce labor cost.  While the
market  may eventually require a compensating wage  increase for employers who are
outside the formal old age  system, employers may not perceive this in the short run, or
even in the long run if labor markets are imperfect or if they can attract workers who do
not place a high value on social security benefits. If employers can keep their labor costs
low by staying out of the system, this increases their international competitiveness and
consequently the level of employment. Governments must weigh carefully the questions
of who will bear the payroll tax if effective coverage is extended, and how high can the
tax  be  to  avoid  negative  consequences on  employment.  Many  developing  countries
choose  a  relatively  high  replacement rate  target  of  60-70%,  which  requires a  high
contribution rate for sustainability. A lower target replacement rate and contribution rate
may facilitate coverage,  decrease the trade-offs with  evasion and unemployment, and
therefore be welfare enhancing.
The tighter the linkage between benefits and contributions, the greater the incentive for
workers to  pay and the less  likely that  labor costs will rise.  However, evasion never
completely goes away, because of the high discount rate and liquidity needs of many
workers and the perception of employers that the market does not require them to pay
higher wages in lieu of contributions.
This discussion suggests that expanded coverage is facilitated by economic growth and
higher wages, so the bottom end of the income distribution can think about the future as
well as the present. It also suggests that a substantial redistributional component may be
needed to  increase compliance among low income  workers and to  make compliance
welfare-enhancing. Such redistribution should be  explicit (or it may go to  the wrong
10parties) and  a  distinction should be made  between redistributing to  contributors (via
social security) and to noncontributors via social assistance (see below). Governments
should be particularly careful to  avoid perverse redistributions from those outside the
system to those inside, while coverage is low.
Redistribution within social security may be achieved by having a very progressive or flat
benefit formula in the first pillar  (as in the Netherlands) or by introducing a floor or
foregoing the usual ceiling on taxable earnings (as in  Switzerland) or by providing a
minimum pension  guarantee (as in Chile and Kazakhstan).  In Uruguay, low income
contributors to  the  new  funded  pillar  receive  an  extra  benefit  (Queisser,  1998). In
Colombia a "solidarity tax" of 1% if imposed on salaries above a specified level and used
to finance subsidies to low income contributors (Valdes-Prieto, 1998). These better pay-
offs or lower charges may encourage participation and thereby reduce the problem of the
uninsured, because they take into account the lower demand and higher opportunity cost
among low income workers for formal old age security programs. It may be preferable
(and more accurate) to interpret such progressive benefits and charges as stemming from
risk differentiation--poor workers are placed into a lower risk category because of their
lower expected lifetimes--rather than from redistributive objectives. This line of thought
also suggests that broader policies such as the provision of small business credit markets
to  low  income  groups may  have  positive  compliance  effects  on  social  security  by
reducing their alternative needs for savings.
However, low income transient workers may not expect to be in the formal sector long
enough to qualify for these redistributive benefits, which often require 20-30 years of
contributions. Moreover, the political feasibility of these policies, and therefore coverage
extension by these means, will be limited by the reluctance of the "haves" to redistribute
much to the "have-nots."
The dificulties  in collectingfrom  small enterprises and the self-employed.  Furthermore,
none of these policies are likely to completely solve the evasion problem, in the absence
of effective enforcement. Now, enforcement is easier for certain groups than for others.
For example it is relatively easy to collect from large companies but more difficult to
collect from small enterprises or the self-employed or subsistence agriculture or transient
workers.  Small enterprises have a short life span; they may come and go before they are
registered and taxed. The self-employed, who must pay both the worker's and employer's
share, have a double incentive to evade and find it easy to under-report their eamings.
Keeping track of transient workers who work irregularly for  different employers is  a
daunting task. These problems exists in  industrialized countries as well, but they are
multiplied  in developing countries where the "difficult"  groups are disproportionately
large and the government's capacity is weak.  Many developing countries do not even try
to cover these groups and those that try often fail. For example, the self-employed, who
constitute about a third of the labor force, are not covered in Chile (World Bank, 1994,
Queisser, 1998). The are covered in Argentina, which is considering excluding them from
the  mandate  because  of  high  evasion.  It  may  be  wise  for  developing  countries  to
concentrate their  limited enforcement capacities in those  sectors where they are most
likely to succeed.
11In sum, the "coverage problem" stems from the fact that the high discount rate of low
income workers and their reluctance to pay social security taxes may be quite rational,
increased coverage may come at the expense of lower take-home pay, higher evasion and
lower employment so a careful cost-benefit analysis must be made, and groups that are
difficult to monitor predominate in developing countries. Thus, expanding coverage may
not be administratively feasible and furthermore, it may  not improve society's  welfare
unless  accompanied by  a  heavy  dose  of  redistribution-which  in  tum  may not  be
politically acceptable.
Empirically, we observe that degree of coverage is closely tied to a country's per capita
income  (World  Bank,  1994,  p.  40).  Until  government's  capacity  to  enforce  tax
collections increases, the structure of the economy changes to  facilitate this,  and the
earning capacity of the bottom half of the labor force grows-all  of which occurs with
the process of  economic development--it is difficult and  not  necessarily desirable to
extend contributory social security coverage to the entire population.
Finally,  while reform  may draw  a  sharper  line  between the  insured  and  uninsured,
augmenting  coverage  in  the  absence  of  reform  would  simply  aggravate  an  already
nonsustainable fiscal situation, increase the implicit pension debt and make reform more
difficult. It is essential to put social security on a financially sound basis, which includes
a large funded defined contribution component, before expanding coverage.
Are voluntary contributions the answer to the coverage problem?
Some analysts have urged that voluntary contributions be permitted to  extend pension
insurance to those who don't  have covered jobs.  In Japan, men are encouraged to make
flat contributions for their wives, in exchange for the promise of a flat benefit.  In China,
workers in township and village enterprises are subject to social pressure to contribute to
their individual accounts, on a  "voluntary" basis.  Making coverage voluntary avoids the
evasion and unemployment problems discussed above.  In several countries community
organizations such as NGO's  have tried  to  set  up  small-scale self-help  schemes for
informal sector workers (van Ginneken, 1999).
While the availability of voluntary mechanisms is probably utility-improving, I believe
we shouldn't  expect them to  accomplish very much.  After all, a basic reason for the
existence of mandatory programs is that many people, especially low income people, will
not save much voluntarily for their retirement and the basic reason for limited coverage is
that,  even when the program is mandatory, many workers and employers will evade
making contributions because they believe that participation does not make them better
off. In addition, the transactions costs of collecting many small voluntary contributions
might be relatively high.  Voluntarism and self-help schemes are more likely to succeed
in programs when the costs are small and the benefits immediate (as for micro-finance or
primary health care). It is likely to be only a small part of the solution to a large long term
old age security problem.
12In addition, I would offer at least three caveats to this approach:  First, if annuities are
promised, they  should be  actuarially fair,  except  for deliberate  redistribution that  is
planned and funded from the start; otherwise, the voluntary program could explode into a
large unfunded unexpected obligation.  Second, in an  individual account saving plan,
workers should be given accurate information about the real rate  of return they will
receive and the replacement rate it will provide.  In China, where some new enterprises
have begun to  cover workers on a  "voluntary"  basis, augmented by  social pressure,
workers have been led to expect a high nominal rate of return based on the assumption of
a  high rate  of inflation.  Workers may not realize that  this nominal  rate will  fall if
inflation falls. Third, voluntary contributions are likely to be small, at best. In China, the
negative real rate of return combined with the small size of the voluntary contributions
will not provided much security in old age.
Social assistance and means-testing-outside  the contributory system
Thus we are driven to the need for social assistance, and possibly the increased reliance
on social assistance, which is largely outside the contributory system, as social security
reforms take place.  Indeed, most countries have some such social assistance program,
aimed at the poorest groups.  Key issues that must be dealt with are: How large should
the program be? How should it be financed? How is eligibility for assistance determined?
Should these criteria be different for the old and the young? How does the availability of
noncontributory assistance affect the fiscal sustainability of the contributory program and
conversely, how does the structure of a contributory program affect the demands upon
social assistance?
How large and how financed?  If social assistance is available without the payment of
contributions, this may further discourage people from participating in the contributory
program.  If contributions shrink and evasion increases, while generous social assistance
is available, this increases the government's fiscal problem and may eventually lead to
the collapse of the contributory program.  The impact on evasion and fiscal sustainability
is likely to depend on the generosity of these social assistance programs relative to the
redistributions available to low income groups in the contributory programn. The latter
should be at least as great as the former.  So society faces a dilemma: If social assistance
benefits are generous they make the contributory program less sustainable; if they are
miserly, they leave the uninsured in poverty, even those who had no opportunity to get a
covered job.  Because of limited enforcement abilities, hence the greater ease of evasion,
governments  in  developing  countries  face  a  more  difficult trade-off  than  those  in
industrialized countries and consequently must  offer less generous social assistance to
create the right incentives. But, given the low level of wages and contributory pensions
for many workers, these "efficient" social assistance pensions may end up below the
poverty line.
The negative impact of social assistance on the contributory program is heightened if it is
financed out of the social security budget, as in Brazil and Uruguay prior to their recent
reforms, where the social security system was charged for benefiaries who had only five
or ten years of contributions.  While some amount of redistribution among contributors is
13desirable, as discussed above, if contributory social security is required to pay to non-
contributors, this increases the tax burden on contributors and their incentive to evade,
and hence is ultimately nonsustainable.  General revenue finance, which has a broader
base, is probably preferable, both on efficiency and equity grounds, for redistribution to
groups that have not contributed for substantial portions of their working lives. Whether
financed out of general revenues or out of a payroll tax, the financial impact of reform on
social assistance expenditures should be estimated, in the process of planning the reform.
How to determine eligibility for  benefits.  Should social assistance benefits be universal,
based on objective criteria such as age and absence of a contributory pension, or should
they be means-tested, and if so, how should the means-testing be done? Argentina offers
an old age pension to workers who don't qualify for regular benefits.  It requires only ten
years of contributions, a criterion that many (but  not all) women  and informal sector
workers can satisfy. However, the fiscal costs of such programs are potentially high.  To
keep costs down, benefits are only 19% of the average wage and are not paid until the age
of 70 (Ley de Seguridad 24.241; Vittas, 1997).  This contrasts with Brazil and Uruguay,
where  15 years of contributions are required but benefits are higher, and Chile, where
contributions are not required, means-testing is used and benefits are paid at an earlier
age (but they are lower). In Chile the size of  the pension  social assistance budget is
predetermined, as is the benefit level. This means that the number of beneficiaries faces a
pre-determined constraint. Currently many localities have waiting lists from  qualified
individuals without access to benefits.
We therefore observe a trade-off between age and income as a test of eligibility, and
between ease of access and size of benefits. Given the correlation between income level
and  longevity,  many poor people  die before they  ever collect in  countries that  rely
primarily on old age as the criterion for eligibility, while many of those who collect are
well above the poverty line. But if the over-all budget is inadequate, then even a means-
tested system will fail to reach many needy households. (For a discussion of these trade-
offs in the contributory program as well see James, 1998).
How  to  carry  out  the  means test. As  noted above,  most  countries, especially most
developing countries, do not offer universal age-based benefits and instead use means-
testing for their social assistance, in order to better target their limited resources to the
poor.  A key element here (besides the over-all bduget constraint) is how the means-test
is carried out.  At least three approaches are available.  In the traditional case, individuals
apply and their applications are evaluated by government officials. Depending on data
availability  and  country  standards,  "means"  may  be  defined  in  terms  of  income
(commonly), assets (as in Australia) or the presence or absence of scarce consumer goods
such as water, electricity, and motorcycles in the households (appropriate in developing
countries).  The  corresponding  problems:  some  people  may  not  apply  because  of
ignorance or stigma, bribery may be necessary to get the application processed, criteria
may not be applied uniformly, households may behave strategically and disguise their
true means, and transactions costs (payments to middle class bureaucrats) may be a high
proportion of total expenditures.  For example, in several Indian states, old people face
lengthy  time  delays  and  commission  payments  that  may  be  needed  to  get  their
14applications processed and  checks delivered (van Ginneken, 1999). In Thailand, village
elders identify the rural poor, mostly widows without children.  This system may work
well in some villages but one can imagine personal favoritism playing a role in others.
In  a  less traditional  model, the process may  be  computerized.  Based  on  data from
household surveys, poor communities and their residents may be  identified and given
stipends.  This method is being used in the Progresa program in Mexico, which targets
poor  rural villages  and families using  an  econometric model that  aggregates  several
socio-economic variables.  The econometric model is structured to give heavy weight to
families with children and to provide an incentive for these children to attend school.  But
old people  also  benefit-and  the  relative weights  given to  school-attending children
versus the old becomes a political issue.  This is approach is worth serious consideration
in other countries.
Still a third method of means-testing involves self-selection: offer assistance in a form for
which mainly low income people will apply.  Self-selection can be achieved by requiring
queues for receipt of cash benefits, a cost which high income people are less likely to be
willing to incur, or by offering in-kind benefits such as free lunches that only low income
people would accept.  In many countries soup kitchens and/or dormitories accommodate
the poorest old, often run by NGO's  but financed by governments. NGO's may provide
the service at lower cost and in a less bureaucratic way than the government, particularly
when small scale ventures are involved.  The advantage of self-selection is that it avoids
the transactions costs and  possible  mis-identification of an  application process.  The
disadvantage is that the benefit  and quality level may not  be optimal, and many old
people may be unable to stand in queues to partake.  At this stage, we don't really know
which of these three methods entails higher transactions costs or greater exclusion of
needy old people.
Old versus young  candidates for  social assistance. This raises a final issue concerning
means-tested programs-should  different criteria apply to old versus young people who
are poor, and how much priority should be given to poor families with children versus the
poor old? These two questions are interrelated.
On the one hand, some analysts argue that eligibility criteria should be more stringent for
the young, since they can work, and should be encouraged to try to seek work, while the
presumption is that the old cannot work, or have low productivity when they work.  The
old, therefore, can be offered social assistance without the labor disincentive effects that
would be incurred by the young.  Of course, the expectation of receiving assistance when
old may discourage saving when young, a different type of disincentive problem.  In
Australia, the young who are unemployed and the  old without adequate income and
assets are guaranteed the same level of benefits, but  with different eligibility criteria
regarding efforts to find employment, since the presumption is that the young can work
while the old can't.  But the  government in Australia feared that saving when young
might  be  discouraged  by  its  means  and  asset-tested  age  pension,  so  they  recently
established  a contributory  mandatory  saving plan  for workers.  This will  eventually
15reduce the moral hazard problem regarding saving, leaving different work requirements
between the old and young.
On the other hand, one can argue that priority for social assistance should be given to
young families with children, who have their entire lives ahead of them.  According to
this line of thought, children should not be penalized for the failure of their parents to
obtain a well-paying job.  Helping the children may be a better long term investment for
society.  Of course,  money  given to  families  may  not  better  the  condition  of  the
children-this  depends on how the marginal income is  spent.  The Mexican Progresa
program is  interesting in  this  regard because it makes  school attendance  one of  the
criteria for aid, and the money is given directly to the mother, who has been shown more
likely to spend it to enhance the welfare of the children.
The role of the extendedfamily  in social assistance programs.  In developing countries,
where the extended family still survives and multi-generational households are common,
a host of other issues arise when social assistance is offered.  First, if old and young live
together  in  multi-generational households,  the  trade-off  between  them  is  less.  To
illustrate: In South Africa a means-tested pension is paid to most older blacks who are
living in rural areas.  This pension originated in apartheid days and was intended for the
small  number  of  urban  whites  who  had  failed  to  accumulate  their  own  private
occupational pensions.  A  much  smaller stipend was paid  to  blacks.  But  with  the
elimination of  apartheid, the  entire  black  population  became  eligible  for  the  larger
stipend, which has cut-off points and benefit amounts that are very high relative to rural
black incomes.  Often, family income goes up substantially when a member reaches the
eligible age.  Since old and young live together in multigenerational households, both
groups benefit from the age stipend. But the trade-off is not completely eliminated.  The
program is very costly and other uses for the money may be more targeted toward the
young and may have a greater social pay-off, such as increased spending on education.
This is a controversial issue in South Africa today.
Second, when the family support system is strong, it is necessary to determine whether
the income and assets of the entire family should count in  applying the means-test, or
only  that  of  the  old  person.  In  Western  industrialized  societies,  the  move  toward
individual responsibility has meant that the government replaces the family as the social
safety net and only the individual's  means are counted.  In contrast, in several Asian
societies, such as Hong Kong and Singapore, children have a legal responsibility to take
care of their parents, and old people can enforce this legally, albeit at great personal price.
In Hong Kong, before the means-tested benefit is paid, children must testify that they are
unable to support their parents.  China is thinking of adopting a similar system.  Indeed,
in multi-generational households it may be  difficult to  separate out the means of the
parent and the child, since both share common living arrangements.
Third, how  can governments  offer  assistance while  encouraging the  continuation of
family responsibility? How can penalties and incentives be structured to complement and
stimulate, rather than crowd-out, family care?  Examples of such incentives include: tax
rebates for children who care for their parents in Malaysia; for children who expand their
16homes to accommodate parents in Japan, Sweden and Norway; and day care centers or
respite  care  to  give  caregivers  temporary  relief  in  Hong  Kong,  Singapore, France,
Germany and the U.K. (World Bank,  1994).  I am not aware of any careful research
evaluating the efficacy of these measures. Such research would be worth doing, and such
policies may be worth serious consideration by other developing countries.
III.  How to Prevent Poverty Among Older Women
Among the old who are poor and uninsured, women are disproportionately represented in
most countries.  They often lack the labor force participation that would entitle them to
contributory  benefits, and  even  if  covered, they are  usually only  "partially  insured"
because their level of education, wages and years of service were low.  They are less
likely than men to have inherited property, and  in some cultures,  assets acquired by
women are taken over and owned by men.  Their greater longevity means that they are
dominant among the very old, who are most likely to be poor, having used up whatever
savings they previously accumulated.
The absence of labor force participation and asset ownership among women was part of a
traditional family system in which husbands participated in the formal markets and wives
worked in the home.  Women provided non-monetized services, especially when young,
while their monetary needs were supposed to be covered by their spouses and eventually
their children.  But in many cases this system fails, especially in old age, when women
are at the receiving end of the lifetime contract.  Marriages break up and the husband is
the one with the formal income.  Husbands die earlier than wives, with their retirement
benefits used up, and  often do not  leave adequate resources to  support the surviving
spouse. (For evidence that families do not choose adequate survivors' insurance, even in
countries where this  is available,  see Auerbach and  Kotlikoff,  1991). Children move
away or have income problems of their own.  In these cases, the monetary support that
the family was supposed to provide is not forthcoming and the low personal income of
women becomes a social problem.
Social security systems should be designed to address the needs of this group. And I am
glad to say that I am working on a project at the World Bank that looks into this issue
more carefully.  Eventually women are likely to participate more broadly in the labor
market and to be  covered on their own, but  in the meantime it seems reasonable that
public policies should ensure that the family support system they counted on when young
continues into old age.
Some  traditional  defined  benefit  social  security  systems  provide  dependents'  and
survivors' benefits to wives of covered workers; the wives are covered by virtue of their
husbands'  coverage.  But  this  means  that  society  at  large  takes  responsibility  for
dependent wives.  The benefits to housewives are financed partially by taxes paid and
benefits foregone by unmarried men and by wives who participate in the labor market-a
high  implicit tax that discourages female labor force participation and accentuates the
problem.
17In the context of multi-pillar systems that are sweeping Latin America, which attempt to
link benefits with contributions to avoid such disincentives, the following measures might
be considered, to extend the implicit family contract into old age:
*  The required purchase of adequate survivors' benefits, during both the working and
retirement stage;
*  The requirement that  men contribute toward  the personal accounts  of their  non-
working wives or that mandatory retirement savings be considered the joint property
of both spouses;
*  Mandatory annuitization, with price indexation, so that the money accumulated in the
workers' accounts is not quickly used up and does not fall in real value;
*  Mandatory joint annuities, so that the lifetimes of both spouses are covered;
*  The use  of unisex  mortality tables,  so that  women  do not  receive lower  annual
benefits than men because of their greater longevity; this implies a redistribution from
men to women that will be  controversial and may be difficult to  implement in a
competitive annuities market;
. Changes  in  legal  arrangements regarding  inheritance, property  and  divorce,  that
improve the position of women.
*  Increased emphasis on female education and labor market equality, to augment the
earning power of women.
Measures such as these would take care of the needs of the largest  group that is not
covered-spouses  who have not participated in the labor market for much of their lives-
and as such would go far toward eliminating poverty among the uninsured old.
IV.  Conclusions
This paper has surveyed the issues that policy makers need to address as they consider
how to provide old age protection for the uninsured. While economic growth is the key to
higher coverage, good policies may help. The following policy recommendations have
emerged:
*  Countries should put their social security systems on a financially sustainable basis
before expanding coverage.  In the meantime, governments should avoid policies that
force the uninsured to subsidize the insured.
*  Coverage expansion to contributory programs may be encouraged by policies such as:
choosing a modest target replacement rate that requires a relatively low contribution rate,
charging reduced contribution rates below  a  specified income threshold,  offering low
income  workers  access to  low  cost  benefits  such  as  survivors'  insurance  (term  life
insurance) rather than requiring them to take the whole package of benefits, and allowing
workers to receive a high (competitive) rate of return on their retirement funds. These
policies may reduce the number of "uninsured."
*  A close link between benefits and contributions enhances the fiscal sustainability of
contributory social security programs and may increase compliance among some groups,
but it also means that those who contribute little will receive little; hence the number of
18"partially insured" may grow and with it the demands on social assistance.  These costs
should be taken into account in planning social security reforms.
*  Evasion from old age security programs stems partly from myopia, but it is also a
rational response to low incomes, short expected lifetimes and absence of effective credit
markets that lead to high discount rates for low income groups.  For this reason, they are
unlikely to contribute much to voluntary programs, and forcing them to contribute on a
mandatory basis may not be optimal unless accompanied by substantial redistribution.
*  In addition, if employers bear the cost of contributions, the result may be decreased
competitiveness  and  increased  unemployment-a  serious  trade-off  in  labor-abundant
countries. Both evasion and unemployment will be mitigated by low contribution rates
and target replacement rates.
*  Even where increased coverage is desirable, it may not be feasible, given the limited
enforcement capabilities of many govermments and the prevalence of small  scale and
enterprises  and  self-employment,  which  are  notoriously  difficult  to  monitor,  in
developing countries.  Given that evasion is contagious, it may be better not  to cover
groups where compliance is likely to be low, and to concentrate enforcement efforts on
sectors where the likelihood of success is high. Social assistance should then be provided
to low income groups who are not part of the contributory program.
*  To  avoid  negative effects  on  the  contributory  program,  redistribution via  social
assistance to the uninsured should not be "too" generous.  In particular, it should not be
greater than redistribution to the low income groups among the insured. It  should be
financed out of general revenues.
*  Means-testing should be used to target social assistance, but this often entails high
transactions costs and potential abuses. Computerized econometric models, self-selection
mechanisms, and provision of in-kind benefits by NGO's  (financed by government) are
worth serious consideration in lieu of traditional targeting mechanisms.
*  Careful consideration should be  given to  the  appropriate balance between  social
assistance to the old and various types of redistributions (cash transfers, education) to
young families with children.
*  To the degree possible, public assistance programs for all ages should be structured to
encourage rather than displace farnily assistance. Moreover, the pay-out phase of defined
contribution plans should incorporate specific measures to ensure spousal responsibility
for the monetary needs of wives who stayed out of the formal labor force because of an
implicit lifetime family contract to this effect.
The growth of formal coverage will accompany the process of economic development.
Until that happens, a large proportion of the population will be  uninsured or partially
insured.  The recent pension reforms tying benefits more closely to contributions are a
step in the right direction for the contributory systems and are a necessary pre-condition
for fiscally sound coverage expansion, but they cannot be expected to increase coverage
in  the  short  run  and  may  even have  the opposite  effect.  Therefore, they  must  be
accompanied by cost-effective well targeted social assistance programs financed out of
general revenues, and by measures that institutionalize the implicit family contract into
old  age.  As  Latin  American  countries consider their  second generation  of pension
reforms, they should be and in some cases are moving in these directions.
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